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Abstract
A number of hardware and software techniques have been proposed to
detect dynamic program behaviors that may indicate a bug in a program. Because these techniques suffer from high overheads they are useful in finding
bugs in programs before they are released, but are significantly less useful
in finding the much harder to detect bugs in long-running programs – the
bugs that are the most difficult to find using traditional techniques. In this
paper we propose the Artemis1 compiler-based instrumentation framework
that complements many pre-existing runtime monitoring techniques, yielding an average asymptotic lower bound on overhead of 11% on the seven
SPEC benchmarks tested.

1

Artemis is the Greek goddess of the hunt and wild animals. Our framework guides the hunt
for wild bugs.

iii
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Introduction

Program correctness and reliability are two of the greatest problems facing the developers, deployers and users of software. The financial implications are tremendous – a NIST report estimates that $59.6 billion dollars a year, or 0.6% of the
GDP, are lost every year because of software errors [24]. Single failures of software can disable businesses like Charles Schwab and Ebay for hours and days,
costing millions of dollars in revenues. Moreover, purely malicious and politically motivated sociopaths exploit software errors to disrupt civil society.
Simultaneous with the increasing risks of bug-ridden code has been the rise in
complexity of individual components and in the systems composed of these components. The number of lines of code, the number of paths through a program,
and the running times of programs have risen dramatically over time, reducing the
effectiveness of both manual debugging and path coverage based testing mechanisms. Moreover, it is commonplace to construct instances of large systems
by lashing together components such as Apache Webserver, J2EE, SQL, and so
forth, where each component may be replaced by a component with similar interfaces, but different implementations. For testers of these components, coverage
of a significant number of paths is impossible because of the complexity of code.
Moreover, because instances of real systems are constructed independently of the
developers of the individual components, it may not be possible for the developer of a component to test the component in the same software and hardware
environment in which it will execute.
This argues for debugging techniques that can be used at runtime during production runs of the program, i.e. for debugging to be a continuous, ongoing part
of deployed software. Previously developed techniques, discussed in more detail in Section 2, while invaluable in their targeted context, are typically either (i)
statically based [22, 14, 3, 34, 9, 10, 37, 15, 36], and therefore cannot examine a
program in the context it actually executes in, (ii) are fast enough to use at runtime, but require hand-modifying the source code and/or user input [23, 6], or (iii)
are too slow to be used in production runs. Sampling across many applications
has been proposed as a solution to reduce the overhead for any given instance of
an application, and thereby enable production run monitoring. Sampling, however, requires many copies of a program be in place, and that the artifacts of the
program be observable. This raises issues about sensitive data leaking from these
programs, and the monitoring of mission critical, but heavily customized programs (and essentially single image programs) like online trading systems used
by brokerage and auction sites.
1

In this paper we present a framework, called Artemis, to enable the use of
baseline monitoring schemes (such as those mentioned above) with single threaded
C programs. The framework reduces the overhead of the monitoring schemes sufficiently that monitoring often becomes fast enough to be used in a production
system. Our framework is predicated on the following observation: because single
threaded regions of programs are essentially deterministic, if the context of that region being entered is the same as the context on a previous, non-anomalous execution of a region, it is likely that the current execution will also be non-anomalous.
In this case, fine grained and high overhead monitoring of the current execution
instance of the region will be less profitable than when the context is different.
This observation motivates the design of our framework, which effectively prefilters execution instances, only monitoring (and incurring the cost of monitoring)
for those instances which are likely to be anomalous. The baseline monitoring
schemes can be any of the various schemes that have been proposed, including
those in [17, 32, 2, 18, 7, 21, 23, 29]. Moreover, because our framework converges, in long running programs or across multiple runs, to a steady-state where
regions are rarely monitored, it is possible to use two or more underlying monitoring techniques with our framework, even when each of the underlying techniques
is too expensive to use in production runs.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• it describes the first framework that uses program context information to
reduce the overhead of monitoring to an acceptable level in long-running
programs, and shows how the framework is used with
– a hardware based monitoring technique (AccMon [38]) that checks for
bugs using program counter invariance;
– a software based monitoring technique (DIDUCE [16]) that checks for
bugs using value invariance;
– synthetic monitoring technique that allows us to examine the behavior of our framework when used with arbitrarily expensive baseline
techniques; and
– a program analysis tool that performs approximate integer range analysis.
• it describes a runtime technique for tracking pointers in the face of aliasing;
• it provides experimental data showing the performance and precision of using our framework with different underlying baseline techniques.
2
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Related Work

Runtime monitoring tools make use of runtime information to detect bugs that
cannot be detected statically. Existing dynamic monitoring schemes fall into two
categories: programming-rule-based (PRB) and statistical-rule-based (SRB).
PRB checks for violations of programming language specifications or software
development specifications. For example “array index cannot exceed the array
bounds” and “concurrent accesses to a shared variable should be synchronized”
are the kinds of rules PRB checkers use to detect bugs. Much work has been done
in this category, including Purify [17], rtcc [32], SafeC [2], Eraser [30], Jones &
Kelly’s tool [18], StackGuard [7], runtime-type-checking [21], [5], [25], CCured
[23, 6], CRED [29], and so on. Each of the tools is capable of detecting violations
against one or a few programming rules.
SRB extracts rules (PC and value invariants) statistically from successful runs
or multiple periods of a single long-running execution, and then uses these rules
to check for violations in a later execution or later periods of an execution in a
long-running job. Value invariance maintains, for each variable, a set of values
that the variable has held. When a value not in the set is found at runtime, it is
recorded as an anomalous value. Program Counter (PC) invariance maintains for
each memory location a set of program counters that access the variable. When a
datum is accessed by a program location that has not previously accessed it, it is
recorded as an anomalous event.
A few studies have been conducted on SRB bug detection. DAIKON [13, 12]
is a pioneering system which detects value invariants at runtime. DIDUCE [16]
detects bugs on the fly by automatically extracting value invariants and using them
to detect violations during execution. Both DAIKON and DIDUCE use valuebased invariants. Liblit et. al. [20] uses statistical analysis to find the difference
between abnormal and normal runs for postmortem bug analysis. AccMon [38]
detects bugs using PC-based invariants. Similarly, each SRB tool detects runtime
violations of one category of statistical rule.
While the designers of runtime monitoring tools strive to make their tools as
efficient as possible, runtime overhead remains one of the biggest challenges in
making these tools practical. One approach to reducing overheads is to make use
of static information provided by static analysis tools, compiler, or user annotations. Examples in this category include [5] and [6]. While static information
alleviates the overhead problem in detecting certain categories of bugs in some
programming languages, it is not a general solution and may involve considerable
modification to source code [6]. More importantly, it does not solve the over3

head aggregation problem that occurs when multiple tools are applied together to
achieve better coverage.
Another approach to reducing overhead is to use sampling [20] to amortize
the monitoring overhead among a large number of releases. This approach is only
applicable when data can be collected from a huge set of sample runs, and is not a
general solution for debugging a piece of software that has limited distribution. It
also requires special data representations to ensure the communication efficiency
and client privacy, which also limits its applicability to existing runtime monitoring schemes. A recent variant of sampling, called adaptive sampling (Chilimbi
and Hauswirth [4]), uses a sampling rate inversely proportional to the frequency
of code segment execution. Adaptive sampling can ensure the coverage of all
executed program segments in a single run. However, adaptive sampling cannot
be used to capture bugs that occur only once in the execution, which makes it
ineffective in detecting the most common bugs like buffer overflow.
A third approach is to perform runtime checking in parallel with the main
execution by either creating a shadow process [28] or executing the checking
code speculatively [27]. These techniques are useful when there are multiple
CPUs available and parallelism can be discovered between the main execution
process and runtime checking process. These techniques are complementary to
the Artemis framework. Artemis can use these techniques to further reduce the
runtime overhead.
Our work is also related to static analysis and model checking ([22], [14],
[3], [34], [9], [10], [37], [15], [36]). Model checking can be used to prove there
is no error, but models are usually difficult to construct and may not always be
feasible. Static checking tools are usually best-effort based tools focused on one
particular category of bugs [11]. Static tools usually use program annotations or
user specifications to improve precision.
Artemis differs from all of these in that it is not, primarily, a technique for
anomaly detection, but rather a framework to reduce the overhead of other anomaly
detection tools. The Artemis framework can be implemented using source-level
or binary-level instrumentation tools like Cetus [19], ATOM [31], Trimaran [33].
We use Cetus.

3

An Overview of Artemis

In this section we give an overview of our framework, and describe its capabilities.
The problem with existing monitoring techniques is that they are expensive –
4

large numbers of accesses must be monitored. Our technique proposes a form of
filtering to reduce this overhead. Specifically, we observe that single threaded programs are deterministic – for a given execution context the program, or a region
of the program, will have functionally equivalent behaviors. We define the execution, or dynamic, context of a program region to be the program state accessed
in that region. Unfortunately, checking this context can be at least as expensive
as checking the sets of invariants themselves. Moreover, determining precisely
the equivalence of two contexts can be difficult, particularly in the presence of
pointers and aliasing. Our technique is predicated on the idea that if the global
context (the state of all in-scope variables, method parameters, and storage reachable from these) is the same then the outcome of an execution of the region, when
projected onto the outcomes of “correct” and “anomalous”, will also be the same.
The global context is, of course, an approximation to the whole context, and program behavior can be non-linear (i.e. small changes in the context can lead to
large changes in the outcome, including an incorrect result) but our experimental results show that with this sampling we can catch errors in programs, while
significantly reducing the monitoring cost.
We approximate global contexts depending on the values and types of the object in the context as described in Section 4.1. As always, our goal is to minimize
the overhead of monitoring and maintaining the state of the context, while gaining
sufficient information about the actual context to be useful in finding potentially
anomalous execution instances of the region to monitor.
The Artemis framework is used as follows. The program is automatically
instrumented by the compiler with context checks and the monitoring required
by the baseline monitoring technique. In the current implementation, a context
checking test consists of an if statement that selects one of two versions of a
procedure. The first version is unchanged from the original program, and the second version is instrumented with the baseline monitoring scheme. The program
can then be optionally executed, with a profile of “normal” values collected to
both train the context checks and the baseline monitoring schemes. After the optional training runs, the program is put into production. The initial contexts are
taken from training runs, or prior production runs. When the current context for
a region is found to not belong to the context being tested against, the baseline
monitoring technique(s) are turned on for the region, and the invariant context for
the region is updated by adding the values of the current context to it. After the
execution any anomalies found by the monitoring techniques are reported, and the
newly formed contexts are saved as invariant profiles (or profiles, for short) for
use by the next run of the program.
5

We note now, and discuss in further detail later, that over time the framework becomes trained and the invariant of a region’s context matches almost all
contexts that lead to non-anomalous behaviors. As a consequence, very few regions are subjected to fine-grained monitoring, and the runtime overhead of the
Artemis framework becomes increasingly close to the cost of comparing the contexts. This means that the granularity of regions, and therefore the number of
contexts tested are strongly correlated to the asymptotic overhead of the system.
Because procedures introduce parameters, and are natural units of functionality,
making regions larger than procedures seemed unwise, whereas making regions
smaller than procedures (e.g. at loop nest boundaries) seemed likely to lead to
untenable overheads in non-numerical program, and with little gain in precision.
In numerical programs, where loop nests may contain a large amount of work,
defining regions at this finer granularity may prove useful, and is currently being
investigated. Profiling, conducted during training runs, can provide information
to guide region formation, but this not done in the current version.

4

Implementation

4.1 Context Representation
As discussed previously, exactly representing and comparing contexts is too expensive. In the presence of pointer aliasing, this check potentially requires comparing the entire memory space. Therefore, it is infeasible to record the precise
context for future comparison, or to perform a precise comparison of the context
at the entrance of a code region.
We approximately model the context of a code region as a set of independent
variables and pointers (ignoring the correlations between the elements) that are
accessed in the code region. Each variable in the set is represented by its corresponding int value (by directly casting, or hashing multiword objects), and each
pointer in the set is represented by its type in declaration. The scheme of approximating a variable’s value by an integer value and approximating a memory object
being pointed to by the pointer’s runtime type is inspired by the techniques in [16]
and [8].
Previously observed contexts are recorded as context invariants. Each context
invariant contains these components: a list of value invariants (each value invariant
records all previously seen values of one variable in the context), and a table of
pointer types (each entry contains a mask representing the types of pointers which
6

1 unused (19) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
void

short

int

char

float

long

unsigned

signed

double

wchar_t

struct / union

pointer of pointer

suspicious bit

Figure 1: Pointer type invariant table. The table is indexed by the lower 10 bits of the
pointer value (cast to unsigned int). Each entry contains a bit mask representing the
types of pointers pointing to that location observed previously.

previously pointed to the same address, indexed by the pointer value). Context
invariants are bound to regions, i.e. each context invariant records only previously
seen contexts at the entrance of a code region.
A variable’s value invariant uses the value invariant representation described
in [16]. Each value invariant contains two parts: a base value and a mask.
Each bit in base value records the value of that bit when the value invariant
records its first integer value; each bit in mask records if a different value of that
bit has been observed in a later recording. Given first integer value of V , the value
invariant is initialized to base value = V ; mask = ¬0. Suppose the current
observed value is V 0 : it matches the invariant only if (V 0 ⊕ base value) ∧
mask == 0, where ⊕ is exclusive or. The invariant can be relaxed when a new
value is observed by updating the mask: mask = mask∧¬(V 0 ⊕base value).
The Artemis framework can also be configured to prevent invariant updating after
sufficient learning, which is an effective mechanism to prevent malicious training.
In order to achieve high efficiency and to handle pointer aliasing, a global
pointer type invariant table is used to record the runtime types of pointers. The layout of the pointer type invariant table is shown in Figure 1. The table (1024 entries)
is indexed by the lower 10 bits of the pointer value (cast to unsigned int).
Each entry in the table holds a type invariant, which is a bit mask representing
the pointer types observed previously. The MSB of each entry is suspicious
bit. For example, if a previously seen pointer’s declared type (from its declaration statement) is unsigned int, the bits corresponding to unsigned and
int will be set. In this scheme, different pointers pointing to the same memory
object will be indexed into the same entry in the table, avoiding the global pointer
aliasing problem.
Each entry in the pointer type invariant table is initialized to 0. To check if a
pointer’s type matches the type invariant at runtime, the lower 10 bits of its pointer
value are used to index the pointer type invariant in the table. The pointer type in7

variant is then compared with a statically assigned type mask (with only bits corresponding to the pointer’s declared type set to 1). Suppose the pointer type invariant
is ptr inv and the pointer’s type mask is ptr type mask, then the pointer’s
runtime type matches the pointer type invariant only if (M SB(ptr inv)) ∨
((ptr type mask ∧ ptr inv) ⊕ ptr type mask) == 0. If the pointer
is not NULL, and is a pointer to another pointer, the runtime type of the target
pointer is also checked. The pointer type invariant can be updated if necessary by
ptr inv = ptr inv ∨ ptr type mask.
In addition to resolving aliasing, the pointer type invariant table is designed
to reveal at runtime the potential existence of an important category of bugs overlooked by most existing tools: referencing by an incompatible pointer. For instance, using a char-typed pointer to reference to a double-typed variable will
result in a pointer pointing into the middle of a variable, and dereferencing a
double-typed pointer pointing to a char-typed variable will result in corruption of data. By checking the runtime type of a pointer against the pointer type
invariant, which represents the types of “compatible pointers types”, a potentially
mistyped pointer can be detected during context checking. The observant reader
may have noticed that the pointer type invariant table itself is a useful tool to detect mistyped pointer dereference errors. A further exploration of this capability
is beyond the scope of this paper.
To determine if the current context representation matches a context invariant
at the entry to a code region, Artemis checks each variable and each pointer in the
set against their corresponding value invariant and pointer type invariant. If any of
the checks return mismatch, the current context is considered to be different from
any previously observed context.
Context at the program level is represented using max
argument length (maximum string length of any argument in argv[]) as
the program level approximation. max argument length records the length
of the longest argument observed previously, and is carried across different runs
of the program via the invariant profile (discussed in Section 4.4). If the length
of any argument (argv[i], i = 1, 2, ... argc-1) in the current commandline exceeds max argument length, Artemis sets the “suspicious bit”
of the entry in the pointer type invariant table corresponding to argv[i]. This
ensures that if a pointer p is aliased to an over-sized commandline argument, context checks at the entrances of code regions accessing p will report a mismatch,
and the baseline detection tool will be activated to monitor for potential violations.
max argument length is preset to be 20, which is large enough to allow most
commandline arguments, yet too small for most exploits from commandline argu8

ments [26].
In the default configuration, Artemis updates the invariants (variable value invariants, pointer type invariants, and max argument length) when it reports
a context mismatch. This ensures that the new observations can be included in the
context invariant if the new context turns out to be a legal context. It can also be
configured to freeze context invariants to protect itself against malicious training.

4.2 Inserting Context Checks
We use the Cetus C compiler [19] to insert context-checking instrumentation into
the source code. At each procedure entrance, we insert instrumentation to check
the current context representation against the learned context invariants (as discussed in Section 4.1) at that particular program point. Code is also inserted to
turn on monitoring if the current context representation does not match the learned
context invariant, and to turn off monitoring otherwise. Before we turn on/off
monitoring, the current monitoring state (ON or OFF) is saved, and restored when
the function returns. This ensures that a decision made within the callee does not
change the monitoring in the caller after the callee returns.
If the baseline monitoring scheme is binary-level or hardware-based, we turn
on monitoring before each call to a library function whose source code is not
available. The current monitoring state is remembered before the library call, and
is restored after the library call returns. For standard C libraries, an optimization
effort is underway to build a list of safe library functions for which monitoring
is not needed. This technique is similar to the way CCured [6] handles standard
C library calls. With this technique, monitoring overhead within safe standard C
libraries can be reduced.
The handling of small functions is a special case. Since the overhead savings
from not monitoring a region should exceed the overhead of checking the context
and deciding whether or not to monitor, we always leave monitoring on for small
functions. Our assumption is that it is not profitable to check the context in order
to save the monitoring overhead of very few statements. In our current implementation, small functions are those functions that contain fewer than five simple
statements (i.e. no loops, switch statements, etc.). The threshold is a tunable
configuration parameter. It should be set smaller when the baseline monitoring
scheme is expensive since the monitoring overhead on a few statements may still
exceed the context check overhead in that case.
The compiler instrumentation of the Artemis framework is easily configured
by a few parameters. By default, Cetus inserts at a procedure entrance context
9

checks and the code to turn on/off baseline monitoring based on the result of the
context check. Code replication (discussed in Section 4.5) is enabled if the baseline tool is based on source-level instrumentation; library call wrapping is enabled
if the baseline tool is based on binary instrumentation or monitoring hardware.

4.3 Interfacing with Baseline Monitoring Schemes
Artemis is designed to be a general framework that works with source-level,
binary-level and hardware baseline monitoring schemes. The interface between
the baseline monitoring scheme and Artemis is a switch, which is used to turn the
baseline monitoring on and off. This simple interface makes it easy to adapt an
existing monitoring tool to work with Artemis.

4.4 Invariant Profile
In its default configuration, Artemis uses an invariant profile to avoid losing the
learned context invariants when the program terminates. During a normal run,
each time a new context is observed, Artemis learns the new negative observation
by updating the invariants in the context invariant. Without profiling, this learning
process needs to be started from the beginning in every run. Artemis reduces unnecessary activations of the baseline monitoring tool during the learning process
by dumping the context invariants into an invariant profile before the program
terminates, and loading the invariant profile the next time the program runs.
Because pointers can point to dynamic objects whose addresses in memory are
not necessarily the same in two different runs, Artemis does not dump the pointer
type invariant table as part of the invariant profile.
Invariant profiling also makes it possible for software companies to build profiles during their in-house testing phase, and then to ship the released software
with runtime monitoring code together with the invariant profile. This makes it
possible to use heavy-weight runtime monitoring schemes in real world applications at the cost of a light-weight monitoring scheme.

4.5 Optimizations
If the baseline tool works by instrumenting the source code with checking functions, code replication [1, 20] can significantly improve the performance of the
resulting code when interfacing the baseline tool with Artemis. Figure 2 shows
an example where Artemis works with a runtime null pointer checker. The naive
10

foo()
{
if (context match){
MON_OFF;
}else{
MON_ON;
}
...
if (MON_ON){
baseline_check_NULL_ptr(p);
}
*p = 2;
...

foo()
{
if (context match){
...
*p = 2;
...
}else{
...
baseline_check_NULL_ptr(p);
*p = 2;
...
}
}

}

(a)

(b)

Figure 2: (a) – a naive interface between baseline tool and Artemis; (b) – applying code
replication on function body

version (Figure 2(a)) allows Artemis to control the monitoring by inserting the
testing code at each monitoring call site. This simple scheme is not desirable in
practice because the existence of a branch precludes compiler optimizations that
could have been applied. A more efficient way of interfacing with Artemis is
presented in Figure 2(b). By creating two versions of the function body (one instrumented with runtime monitoring, one not instrumented), execution can take a
fast path when Artemis determines that no monitoring is necessary. Because most
context checks succeed after some initial learning, the fast path is usually taken,
completely avoiding the overhead of the baseline monitoring. In our current implementation, Artemis replicates the function body by default. 2

5

Experimental Results
Benchmark
running time increase (%)
binary size increase (X)
profile size (k)

ammp
0.28
0.84
2.11

bzip2
16.71
0.84
1.37

equake
10.45
0.49
0.45

gap
18.86
1.23
12.81

mcf
-0.46
0.57
0.36

parser
19.42
1.01
4.90

vpr
11.75
0.92
4.11

MEAN
11.00
0.84
3.73

STD
8.29
0.25
4.36

Table 1: Time and space overhead of using Artemis framework (with no profile) without
baseline tools.

We present the results of four experiments. In the first experiment, we focus on the reduction in monitoring overhead when using the Artemis framework
2

Currently, the only exception to the default policy is when there are static local
variables inside the (nested) compound statement. It is ongoing work to develop the analysis and transformation to allow code replication in the presence of static variables.

11

with baseline monitoring schemes. We also present the asymptotic overhead of
the Artemis framework, simulations showing Artemis framework overheads with
generic monitoring schemes, and how the monitoring overhead approaches an
asymptotic overhead over time. In the second experiment, we use the Artemis
framework on AccMon, a state-of-the-art hardware-based monitoring tool for
memory bugs [38]. We present the interface between Artemis and AccMon, the
monitoring overhead, and three examples of detecting real bugs in benchmark programs. In the third experiment, we present an application of the Artemis framework on a program analysis problem – dynamic whole program integer range
analysis. We present its runtime overhead improvement and precision in discovering the integer ranges. In the fourth experiment, we use our framework with a
variant of DIDUCE [16] for C (C-DIDUCE) – a state-of-the-art software monitoring scheme based on value invariants [16]. We present the implementation of
C-DIDUCE, its interface with Artemis, the runtime overhead improvement and
the accuracy in detecting runtime invariant violations. All these experiments are
conducted on a DELL Precision 350 workstation (3.0GHz Pentium IV with Hyperthreading, 1.5G memory) running RedHat Linux 9.0 with gcc 3.3.3. All
of the programs are compiled with gcc -O2 except those used with AccMon,
which use the compiler for the iWatcher simulator compiler, a variant of gcc for
MIPS.

5.1 Overhead Limits
As discussed in Section 3, Artemis’ context representation will converge to the
closure of previously observed contexts over time. Consequently, the runtime
monitoring overhead approaches its asymptotic overhead, i.e. almost all of the
runtime monitoring is skipped and the only overhead is that of context checking.
The context checking overhead is the asymptotic lower bound of Artemis with any
baseline monitoring scheme, regardless of the overhead of the baseline scheme.
Table 1 shows the overhead of running Artemis without any baseline monitoring tools, measured using seven SPEC 2000 C programs. No invariant profile is
loaded. Using Artemis alone adds 11% overhead on average with a standard deviation of 8.29%; the resulting binary is 0.84 times larger on average with standard
deviation of 0.25. Since the instrumented programs suffer only context checking
overhead under this configuration, this is the theoretical asymptotic lower bound
of the overhead of using Artemis together with any baseline monitoring scheme.
This lower bound is attainable only when Artemis and the baseline monitoring
scheme are perfectly interfaced, i.e. no baseline monitoring overhead is incurred
12

when all the context checking succeeds. For example, if all the procedures are
replicated as shown in Figure 2(b) and the fast path executes as efficiently as the
original procedure body, only context checking overhead remains when all the
contexts match the context invariants. However, the interface shown in Figure
2(a) is not perfect because the if(MON ON){} statement adds some overhead
whether or not the context check succeeds. In practice, this lower bound is often
not attainable for several reasons. First, not all the function bodies are replicated
(as discussed in Section 4), thus the interface is not perfect in all the functions.
Second, the replicated version is not as efficient as the original version since code
replication incurs overhead [1, 20]. Third, monitoring may happen in library calls
if the call site is wrapped (as discussed in Section 4.2). Finally, because we do not
dump the pointer type invariant table into the profile, Artemis incurs some initial
context check failures when pointers are involved in the contexts. Therefore, all
of the monitoring is not skipped even if the context was seen in a previous run of
the program. Although the asymptotic lower bound is not always achieved, we
still achieve a significant overhead reduction when using the baseline monitoring
scheme with the Artemis framework, as will be shown in this section.
To measure overhead when using various baseline monitoring schemes, we
use a simple monitoring simulator. Our simulator models a generic baseline monitoring tool which inserts a call to a checking function at program points of its
interest. This is by far the most widely used monitoring paradigm in today’s monitoring tools (e.g. Purify, DIDUCE). Without any knowledge of what program
points should be monitored and what the check function actually does, our simulator inserts a dummy checking function call at a program point with probability
p. The parameter p and the overhead within the dummy check function can be
adjusted to cause the desired monitoring overhead. Artemis controls an ON and
OFF switch. The checking function is called only when the monitoring is turned
on.
Figure 3 shows how the overhead of {Artemis + simulated baseline monitoring
tool} changes along with the baseline monitoring overhead. The data is obtained
on SPEC 2000 benchmark programs (those used in Table 1) without profile information from previous runs (this is the case when the program is executed for the
first time). Each of the seven benchmark programs is run five times, each time
with a different simulated baseline monitoring scheme and overhead. Each dot in
the figure represents an (x, y) pair, where x is the baseline monitoring overhead
and y is the overhead of baseline monitoring controlled by the Artemis framework.
As can be seen, by eliminating unnecessary monitoring calls, the overall overhead
of {Artemis + simulated baseline monitoring tool} increases much slower than
13

12

baseline+Artemis overhead

10

8

6

y = 0.1005x + 0.5881

4

2

0
0.01

0.1

1

10

100

baseline overhead (log scale)
(baseline overhead, baseline + Artemis overhead)

Linear Regression Line

Figure 3: simulated overhead of the baseline monitoring and baseline + Artemis without
profile.

the baseline overhead. A simple linear regression shows that when the baseline
monitoring scheme causes x times slowdown, using Artemis with the baseline
scheme (without profile) will bring the overhead down to y = 0.1005x + 0.5881.
As discussed previously, when a profile is used the monitoring overhead will approach the asymptotic overhead shown in Table 1. Although the performance
varies with the program and the input, the trend shows that using Artemis brings
significant performance benefits when the baseline overhead exceeds a certain
threshold. This threshold is 65% for SPEC-like programs without a profile (by
solving the equation x = 0.1005x + 0.5881), and 11% (theoretical asymptotic
lower bound) for long-running programs or with a profile. Given that most runtime monitoring schemes suffer much higher overheads, and the overhead is even
higher when multiple monitoring schemes are used in combination, Artemis’ approach has significant performance benefits, which increases the applicability of
the underlying baseline monitoring scheme.
To demonstrate the convergence of overhead using {Artemis + simulated baseline monitoring tool} in long-running programs and across multiple runs, we use
the bzip2 benchmark with a simulated “representative” baseline monitoring tool
which has a runtime overhead of approximately 4X (this is a “representative overhead” of many bug-detection tools). Figure 4 shows the convergence of overhead
(of the first run, without profile) of {Artemis + simulated baseline monitoring
tool} when the memory image size increases (the larger the memory image, the
longer the running time). As seen from the figure, the overhead approaches the
lower bound as the memory image size increases. Figure 5 shows the convergence
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Figure 5: Convergence of overhead of bzip2 over multiple runs with profiles. The inputs
are randomly generated ACSII files.

of overhead of {Artemis + simulated baseline monitoring tool} over multiple runs.
Each run uses a different input. Each input is a randomly generated ASCII file of
size 5M. A profile is used by Artemis to carry invariants from a previous run to the
next except for the first run which starts without a profile. As shown in the figure,
with the Artemis framework the overhead quickly converges to around 21% after
the first run, reducing the overhead by a factor of 18.8.

5.2 Artemis + AccMon
AccMon [38] is a state-of-the-art hardware-based runtime monitoring tool for
memory-related bugs. It relies on PC invariants to detect illegal accesses. During
the training phase, it forms the set of PC’s that access each monitored datum in
15

each monitored memory region. During the detection phase, if a memory region
is accessed by an instruction whose PC is not present in the memory region’s legal
PC set, an alert is issued.
AccMon is built on the iWatcher infrastructure [39]. iWatcher allows a user
to associate a user-specified checking function with each monitored memory region. When the monitored memory region is accessed, the checking function is
automatically triggered by the hardware without generating an exception to the
operating system.
To use AccMon with Artemis, we make one change to the checking function
used in AccMon: each time the checking function is invoked, it tests a flag. If the
flag is set to OFF, the checking function returns without performing the checking,
otherwise it checks for PC invariants violations as usual.
In our experiments, AccMon is configured as described in [38] except that
we do not use thread level speculation. We use programs with real bugs (see
[38]) in our experiments. Due to compatibility problems between Cetus and the
simulator’s backend compiler, we are only able to build ncompress-4.2.4,
polymorph-0.4.0 and gzip-1.2.4 with the Artemis framework. ncompress
is a compression and decompression utility that is compatible with the original
UNIX compress utility, gzip is a popular compression utility provided by the
GNU project and polymorph is a tool to convert Windows-styled file names to
UNIX file names.
All three of these programs have buffer overflow problems. In ncompress-4.2.4,
input file name longer than 1024 bytes overflows a stack buffer and corrupts the
function’s return address, in gzip-1.2.4, an input file name longer than 1024
bytes overflows a global buffer, and in polymorph-0.4.0 an input file name
longer than 2048 bytes overflows a global buffer. If this overflow in polymorph-0.4.0
is not detected, the global buffer is then copied into a stack buffer using strcpy(),
which corrupts the function return address. These bugs represent the buffer overflow bugs most frequently exploited by malicious users [26].
For all three programs, the Artemis framework detects a program context
change and sets the monitoring to ON at the functions where the overflow first
happens. For ncompress-4.2.4 and gzip-1.2.4, AccMon then immediately detects the violation. For polymorph-0.4.0, AccMon is activated but
does not detect the bug when the global buffer first overflows because no memory
region monitored by AccMon is overwritten. Artemis does not detect any context
change when the global buffer is used to overflow the stack buffer (the second
buffer overflow). But the bug is detected by Artemis’ library call wrapping mechanism, which turns on monitoring before strcpy(). AccMon does not catch
16
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the first overflow because it only overflows the buffer by 100 bytes and does not
access a region monitored by AccMon.
We evaluate the overhead reductions when using Artemis by providing inputs of different sizes to ncompress-4.2.4 and gzip-1.2.43 . The inputs are randomly generated ASCII files. Figure 6 shows the performance on
ncompress-4.2.4. Because AccMon has an extremely low overhead (and
even a small speedup on some inputs) on this benchmark with the given data set,
using our framework results in a small slowdown. Figure 7 shows the performance on gzip-1.2.4. Because AccMon has relatively high overhead, using
our framework significantly improves the monitoring overhead by a factor of 2.67.
3
The running time of polymorph-0.4.0 with the default input data set is significantly less
than the time to initialize the Artemis framework data structures, and so we do not report numbers
for it since our framework is intended for long running programs.
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5.3 A Practical Dynamic Whole-Program Integer Range Analysis
Integer range analysis computes the ranges of integers in the program. It is a useful tool for program analysis and debugging purposes. For instance, it is shown
in [34] that the array bounds checking problem is a special case of integer range
solving. By extracting the array subscript expression and assigning it to a unique
temporary local integer variable, any array bounds check problem can be converted into an integer range solving problem by testing if the range of the temporary variable exceeds the array bounds. In applications with resource constraints
(e.g. embedded systems), integer range information can be used to guide systemspecific optimizations (e.g. determining a good initial buffer size). We note that
even approximate information is useful for these purposes.
When applied to array bounds check, static integer range analysis suffers a
severe precision loss (as reported in [34], the false alarm to real vulnerability ratio
is 10 to 1, and missed one real bug in sendmail 8.7.5) due to its conservativeness and pointer aliasing. Although runtime integer range analysis has the
advantage of using runtime information to improve precision, its application is
limited by its overhead, particularly when integer range analysis is used to provide information to other analyses or runtime systems. That is, adding the additional overhead of runtime integer range analysis to the other already high runtime
overheads is usually not profitable.
With the Artemis framework, however, the overhead is less of a concern. Because Artemis approaches its asymptotic overhead regardless of the baseline monitoring scheme, even if a combination of monitoring schemes are used, runtime
integer range analysis can be efficiently used to assist other runtime analyses or
monitoring tools. For example, with integer range information, even a nonprofessional programmer can write an efficient and fully compatible array bounds
checker by comparing the ranges of array subscript expressions to the array’s declared length, while the state of the art runtime checking tools like StackGuard
[7], Jones & Kelly’s tool [18], and SafeC [2] all involve advanced compiler techniques and incur runtime overheads of 69% − 125% (StackGuard Canary), 1200%
on average (J&K), and 130 − 540% (SafeC), and often suffer from compatibility
problems because of special tricks used in code generation.
We implement a simple integer range analyzer, which probes integer variable’s
value when it is are read or written4 . In our current implementation, we do not
4

With sufficient pointer aliasing information, we can eliminate some of the probes
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break an expression into multiple subexpressions and evaluate the intermediate
values. To interface with the Artemis framework, we build a switch to skip probing when the monitoring is turned off.
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Figure 8: Overhead of the baseline whole-program integer range analysis and the overhead of the baseline analysis + Artemis
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accuracy given below (compared with the ranges found by the baseline analysis).

We apply this analyzer to seven SPEC 2000 benchmark programs, and compare the results obtained when this analyzer is used with and without Artemis.
Figure 8 shows the improvement in overhead when the programs run for the first
time (no profile) with and without the Artemis framework. The overhead will approach the asymptotic overhead over time. Figure 9 shows the average accuracy
when the values are read.
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on the ranges discovered. From the figure, we can see that when using the Artemis
framework, 70.12% of ranges are detected precisely, and 79.02% ranges are detected with 90% or higher precision5 . This accuracy is good enough to provide
information to optimize the initial buffer size and to detect array out-of-bound
errors Statistically, we have > 70% chance to detect off-by-one-byte overflows,
and > 79% chance to detect those overflow by more than 10%. This is very good
compared to existing buffer-overrun detectors evaluated in [35].

5.4 Artemis + DIDUCE
DIDUCE [16] is a state of the art runtime bug detection tool for Java programs.
DIDUCE’s bug-detection mechanism is based on runtime value-based invariant
detection and checking. Violations of learned invariants are considered indications
of possible bugs. DIDUCE instruments the original program (class files) with
calls to the DIDUCE runtime system, passing the values of tracked expressions
to DIDUCE checking and reporting functions. The runtime system is responsible
for learning invariants and detecting invariant violations. DIDUCE checks expressions at the following program points: 1. object read and writes (including
arrays); 2. static variable read and writes; 3. procedure call sites. The expressions
DIDUCE tracks by default include: 1. the value being read or written; 2. the
non-array parent object of a field accessed; 3. the difference between the values
of the location accessed before and after a write operation. DIDUCE’s value invariance is based on integer types only, ignores all values of floating point data
types, and handles references by taking the hashcode of the String object containing the name of its runtime type. DIDUCE ranks the invariant violations it detects
based on confidence change before and after an invariant update (only if the value
does not match the invariant), where confidence is defined as the ratio of the number of times the expression has been evaluated and the the number of values the
corresponding invariant can accept.
Because the current Artemis implementation works on C programs only6 , we
implemented a C variant of DIDUCE (C-DIDUCE) to work with the Artemis
framework. Our implementation is based on [16]. The C variant conforms to
5

We conservatively consider coverage to be 0% if the range found by {baseline +
Artemis} is not a subset of the corresponding range found by baseline. This rare case
happens when an integer stores a memory address, is assigned a random value, or is
assigned an integer value read from input file.
6
The authors see no technical difficulty to do a similar implementation for a different
language.
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Benchmark
ammp
bzip2
gap
mcf
parser
vpr
Average

C-DIDUCE
D+A
overhead
overhead
4.92%
-0.63%
80.59%
21.38%
351.64%
42.17%
13.45%
0.05%
81.50%
54.20%
56.48%
20.66%
98.10%
22.97%
Overhead Ratio: 23.42%

Top
Top
Top
5
10
20
4
8
13
2
6
14
0
1
4
5
6
16
0
3
8
0
2
5
1.83
4.33
10
Top 20 Coverage: 50%

Table 2: Overhead and coverage of using C-DIDICE with Artemis. ‘D + A’ in the top
row stands for {C-DIDUCE + Artemis}. y in ‘Top X’ column means “among the top
X invariant violations found by C-DIDUCE, y of them are still among top X invariant
violations when using C-DIDUCE with Artemis”.

the specifications given in the paper as strictly as possible. Due to differences in
the language features of Java and C, we made our own implementation decisions
when no corresponding specification from the original implementation is applicable to the C variant. Our general strategy is to avoid adding features that are not
proven to be effective in [16].
C-DIDUCE is different from the original implementation in the following
places: 1. Because C is not an object-oriented language, we track program points
which read from or write to global variables instead of objects. static-typed objects are also tracked. 2. For multi-word user-typed objects (including struct),
we cast the first word into an integer value and use this as the value of the object. 3.
Since C has no object references or inheritance relations, we ignore pointer types.
Otherwise, C-DIDUCE is implemented the same as the original DIDUCE (including the violation ranking scheme). C-DIDUCE instruments the source code with
calls to the C-DIDUCE runtime library (containing C-DIDUCE checking and reporting functions).
Since there are no C benchmarks with bugs suitable for DIDUCE, we measure
the overlap the invariant violations in the SPEC 2000 benchmarks detected and
ranked using C-DIDUCE and {C-DIDUCE + Artemis}. This is justified since
C-DIDUCE (and DIDUCE) only detect and rank runtime violations of invariants
– they do not actually identify bugs. Therefore, the extent that Artemis changes
the rankings given by C-DIDUCE is indicated by how many violations detected
by C-DIDUCE and ranked top X is still detected and ranked top X when using
C-DIDUCE with Artemis.
We used C-DIDUCE to detect and rank runtime invariant violations in six
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SPEC 2000 programs7 . We then use C-DIDUCE controlled by Artemis on the
same programs. Table 2 reports the running times of C-DIDUCE and {C-DIDUCE
+ Artemis}, and how many of the Top 5, 10, and 20 violations found by CDIDUCE are still ranked Top 5, 10 and 20 in {C-DIDUCE + Artemis}. On average, using C-DIDUCE controlled by Artemis detects 50% of the original top 20
violations at 23% of the original overhead.
We interpret the loss of precision as a combination of two factors. The first is
a result of the loss of precision when approximating the context with our context
representation. The second is due to DIDUCE’s violation-ranking scheme. The
confidence value is computed as a function of the number of times the invariant is
evaluated. Because Artemis reduces overhead by skipping monitoring when possible, C-DIDUCE computes a different number of times the invariant is evaluated,
which leads to ranking differences.

6

Conclusions

As hardware costs have fallen, and organizations have become increasingly dependent on computers, reliability and productivity have become increasingly important. Runtime monitoring of programs for execution anomolies are potentially
invaluable tool for increasing the robustness of programs and the productivity of
programmers by giving them clues to why long running programs failed. The
framework described in this paper works with wide range of monitoring tools,
imposing an asymptotic overhead of only 11%, and giving speedups of up to 3.2
times using third party monitoring tools on SPEC benchmark programs. It does
this not by random sampling, but by using runtime properties of the program to
determine what regions of a program need to be examined more closely. Because
the Artemis framework reduces the overhead of the underlying monitoring framework, it makes runtime monitoring a reality for many programs, and dramatically
increases the scope of applicability of the underlying monitoring technique.
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equake is a floating-point-intensive program, which doesn’t show any violations on
the invariants C-DIDUCE tracks.
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